DEFENCE AND MENS REA PRINCIPLES IN CONTEMPT CASES

Sasi K.G.

01. Introduction

Section 2 (a), (b) and (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines it as,

“2. Definitions.   In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

 (a)   contempt of court  means civil contempt or criminal contempt;

 (b)   civil contempt  means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;

(c)   criminal contempt  means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which 

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”

The defences available to a contemnor is provided in various sections of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and various precedents adjudged by the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts under it.

02. Defences to a charge of Contempt

The main defences as provided by the Act are the following.

1. Innocent, publication or distribution of matter

Section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads-:

S 3. Innocent Publication and distribution of matter not contempt:-

(1)               A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has published (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) any matter which interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs, ot tends to obstruct, the course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at that time of publication, if at that time he had no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending.

(2)               Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the publication of any such matter as is mentioned in sub-section (1) in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding which is not pending at the time of publication shall not be deemed to constitute contempt of court.

(3)               A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has distributed a publication containing any such matter as is mentioned in sub-section (1), if at the time of distribution he had no reasonable grounds for believing that it contained or was likely to contain any such matter as aforesaid:

 PROVIDED that this sub-section shall not apply in respect of the distribution of—

(i) any publication which is a book or paper printed or published otherwise than in conformity with the rules contained in section 3 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, (25 of 1867);

(ii) any publication which is a newspaper published otherwise than in conformity with the rules contained in section 5 of the said Act.

Explanation:  For the purposes of this section, a judicial proceeding is said to be pending—

 i. in the case of a civil proceeding, when it is instituted by the filing of a plaint or otherwise,

ii. in the case of a criminal proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) (see Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), or any other law—

(a)          where it relates to the commission of an offence, when the charge sheet or challan is filed, or when the court issues summons or warrant, as the case may be, against the accused, and

(b)         in any other case, when the court takes cognizance of the matter to which the proceeding relates, and n the case of a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be deemed to continue to be pending until it is heard and finally decided, that is to say, in a case where an appeal or revision is competent, until the appeal or revision is heard and finally decided or, where no appeal or revision has expired:

(c)          which has been heard and finally decided shall not be deemed to be pending merely by reason of the fact that proceedings for the execution of the decree, order or sentence passed therein are pending.

Supreme Court has held in Rachpudi S. Rao v. Advocate General AIR 1981 SC 755 that Sec. 3 is in nature of an exception to the categories of “criminal contempt” which fall under sub-clause (ii) and to certain categories of “criminal contempt” which fall under sub-clause (iii) of s. 2(c) but not to that category of contempt which falls under sub-clause (i) of s. 2 (c).

 It was held in Pending v. Standard Trimbak Yardi 1975 CrLJ 531 that it depends upon the subjective state of mind of not knowing of pendency and the objecting demonstration by the person concerned that he had no reasonable grounds for believing that any such proceeding was pending.

The position in this regard prior to the 1971 Act was considered by Orissa High Court in State v

Biswanath Mohapatra AIR 1955 Ori. 169. In this case the Court observed that lack of knowledge regarding pendency of a case cannot exonerate a person from the offence of contempt of court

This position has been reversed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and additional immunity was conferred on media regarding publications.

The importance of section 3 and the extent of protection given to the press would be clear only after taking into consideration the relevance of mens rea under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The general principle applicable in contempt law is that to attract the offence of contempt

of court mens rea is not required as in D.C. Saxena v Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216, 258. However, Section 3 incorporates mens rea in a limited extent in the form of knowledge, and provides protection to publisher if he has no reasonable ground for believing that a proceeding was pending. The immunity under section 3 would be available only if the impugned act attempted to interfere with administration of justice is by publication. If the interference is by any other method other than by publication, section 3 and the element of mens rea have no application in contempt proceeding. This point was accepted by the Bombay High Court in Prabhakar Laxman Mokasi v Sadanam Trimbak Yardi, 1975 Cri L J 531, 534 where it was observed that Section 3 can be effective only when the impugned act attempted to interfere with administration of justice is in civil or criminal proceedings. With regard to any other interference, exemption under Section 3 will turn illusory. Supreme Court also accepted this view in Rachapudi Subbarao v Advocate General A.P, AIR 1981 SC 755, where it was observed that Section 3 is in the nature of an exception to those categories of “criminal Contempt” which fall under sub - clause (ii) and to certain categories of “criminal contempt” which come under sub clause (iii) of section 2 (c), but not to that category of contempt which falls under sub clause (i) of section 2 (c).

The protection given to the distributor is based on the thinking that, without protecting innocent distribution, the protection given to publication or publisher is not workable. As per clause (3), a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has distributed a publication containing any such matter which interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the course of justice in connection with civil or criminal proceeding pending at the time of distribution if he had no reasonable ground for believing that it contain or likely to contain any such matter. However as per the proviso to clause (3), to get this protection, the publication must be in conformity with the rules contained in Section 3 and 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1967. As in the case of Clause (1), mens rea in the form of knowledge is necessary under Clause (3) also to make a person liable for distribution of a publication which contain matters which amount to contempt of court.

2. Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding (Section 4)

Section 4 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads-:

S 4. Fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings not contempt

Subject to the provisions contained in section 7, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding or any stage thereof.

In Subash Chandra v. S.M. Agarwal 1984 CrLJ 481 Supreme Court has held that Reading S. 4 with the provision of S. 7 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is clear that what is meant by the words “judicial proceedings” is day to day proceeding of the court.  Assuming though not granting that it is capable of a wider construction, it only permits a publication of “fair and accurate” report of a judicial proceeding.

In Arun Tandon v. Insurance Co. Ltd. 1983 Cr.LJ 459 Supreme Court has held that  before a party to a litigation may be heard in support of its case, it must punge itself of the contempt that tends to impede the course of justice by the contempt that has to be punged should be an admitted or proved contempt and not merely an alleged contempt.

It seems that the rationale behind the Section is based on the English principle that as the trial itself must be open to the public, reporting of the trial must also be treated as part of open justice.

Trial held subject to the public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial caprice vagaries, and serves as a powerful instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity and impartiality of the administration of justice as stated in Naresh v State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1. In D.C. Saxena v Chief Justice of India (1996) 5 SCC 216, when the publication which formed the basis of contempt proceeding was not by reporting through media but by publication through affidavits which formed part of a writ proceeding, the application of protection under section 4 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was held by the Supreme Court that in that case the protection of Section 4 was not available.

The general principle in this regard is that, under the pretext of shelter given by the provision of law, incorrect and dishonest reporting cannot be permitted as reported in Progressive Port and Dock Workers v K.M. Mathew, 1984 Cri L J 1021, 1022. In Subbash Chand v S.M. Agarwall 1984 Cri L J 481, it was observed that a report which gives absolutely one sided picture cannot be treated as fair and accurate report. In Susil Sharma v State (Delhi Admn.), 1996 Cri L J 3944, 3950 it was held that the report need not be a verbatim reproduction of what actually happened in a court, provided it is accurate.

In Dr.D.C. Saxena v Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 S.C.C 216, 267 it is stipulated that to attract the plea of fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding, the words used must be reasonable and no words may be added, omitted or substituted if the effect is prejudicial to one party in the litigation. In re Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466, 474 holds that a publication can claim the status of fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding only if reasonable care has been taken by the publisher.

3. Fair criticism of judicial act (Section 5)

Section 5 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads-:

S 5. Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt

A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided.

In In re Roshan Lal Ahuja 1993 Supp 4 SCC 446 Supreme Court held that Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments fair comments even if outspoken but made without maturity or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court.

 In Vincent Panikulangara v. Gopal Kurup 1982 CrLJ 2094 Supreme Court held that in a democracy fair criticism of the working of all the organs of State should be welcome and would in fact promote the interests of democratic functioning. Sec. 5 of the Act evidently enacted with a view to secure the right of fair criticism provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of the case which has been heard and finally decided. This does not mean that the right to commit for any contempt by scandalizing the court has become obsolete. The question would still be whether the publication alleged to be offending is by way of fair comment on the merits of the case.

In Arun Tendan v. Insurance Co. Ltd. 1983 Cr LJ 459 Supreme Court held that in the case of issuance of mere notice of contempt, the right of hearing cannot be denied. Refusing a right of hearing to a party against whom merely a notice for contempt has been issued is fraught with grave injustice.

4. Complaint against the presiding officers-of Subordinate Courts to the High Court done in good faith (Section 6)

Section 6 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads-:

S6. Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts when not contempt

A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate court to—

(a)                any other subordinate court, or

(b)               the High Court,

to which it is subordinate.

Explanation:    In this section, “subordinate court” means any court subordinate to a High Court.

In State of M.P. v. Chandrakant Saraf 1985 CrLJ 1716 Supreme Court held that unwarranted and defamatory attack upon the character and ability of the Judge made by the counsel in the application of transfer of proceedings from the said court does not constitute a mere complaint under s. 6 of the Contempt of Court Act, but clearly constitutes criminal contempt by scandalizing the court within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

5. Publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or Camera (Section 7)

Section 7 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 reads-:

S 7. Publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in camera not a contempt except in certain cases:-

(1)        Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding before any court sitting in chambers or in camera except in the following cases, that is to say--

(a)                where the publication is contrary to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force;

(b)               where the court, on ground of public policy or in exercise of any power vested in it, expressly prohibits the publication of all information relating to the proceeding or of information of the description which is published;

(c)                where the court sits in chambers on in camera for reason connected with public order or the security of the State, the publication of information relating to those proceedings;

(d)               where the information relates to a secret process, discovery or invention which is an issue in proceedings.

(2)        Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing the text or a fair and accurate summary of the whole or any part, of an order made by a court sitting in chambers or in camera, unless the court has expressly prohibited the publication thereof on grounds of public policy, or for reasons connected with public order or the security of the State, or on the ground that it contains information relating to a secret process, discovery or invention, or in exercise of any power vested in it. 

In Progressive Port and Dock Workers Union v. K.M. Mathew 1984 CrLJ 1061 Supreme Court held that The press reporter and the publisher of newspapers do not have any indefeasible right to put his own gloss on the statements in court by selecting stray passages out of context which might have a tendency to convey to the reader to the prejudice of a party to the proceedings a cause different from what would appear when the statement is read in its own context.

In Hargowandas B Kotak v Chimanlal Vadilal Shah, A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 86, the Bombay High Court observed that no chamber proceeding shall be published without an order of the Court and for publishing a chamber proceeding without the specific order of the court, the contemnor was punished to pay a fine of rupees one thousand.

The same view was adopted by the same High Court in a much earlier judgment, Purshottam Harjiwan v Navnitlal AIR 1926 Bom. 208. The combined reading of section 4 and section7 will lead to an inference that fair criticism of judicial act held in open court is not contempt and fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings before any court sitting in chambers or in camera will amount to contempt of court only in the circumstances mentioned in Section 7. Thus, preventing publication of proceeding even if the court is sitting in chambers or in camera is an exception under the present law.

In Naresh v State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1, the main issue came for the consideration of the Supreme Court was whether press could be prevented from publishing report of judicial proceeding held in open court. The majority adopted the view that that even if the trial is public, publication of evidence of a particular witness could be prevented because the fear of excessive publicity may prevent the witness from speaking truth82. In the minority judgment Sarkar J adopted a different view and opined that such a prohibition is maintainable only if the proceeding was conducted in camera. This judgment made press freedom secondary. However the minority view placed press freedom on the same footing with individual freedom with respect to proceedings conducted in open courts.

6. An order passed by a Court without jurisdiction is void. Violation of such order is not contempt Dr. Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale v. Vidya Vardhini Sabha 1985 Cr.LJ 359

The decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Kuldip Narayan v. Mahendrapal Jain 1984 Cr.LJ 1243 and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dr. Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale v. Vidya Vardhini Sabha 1985 Cr.L.J. 359 supported the contention that disobedience of an order passed by a Court without jurisdiction, will not be contempt. Reliance is next placed on the decision in Dwarakadas Mulji v. Shantilal Laxmidas 1980 MAH LJ 404 referred to in Dr. Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale case, wherein it was held that breach of an undertaking given by a party in a proceedings which is ab initio void for lack of jurisdiction, did not amount to contempt.

7. When High Court directed release of pensionary benefits to petitioner recovering Government dues, was not contempt. State of Haryana v. LU. Dutt, (1995) 29 ATC 540 (SC).

In State of Haryana v. LU. Dutt, (1995) 29 ATC 540 (SC) Supreme Court held that release of pensionary benefits after deducting Government dues does not amount to contempt.

8. When non-compliance of directions of court was not wilful but on account of factor beyond control of contemners, contempt application dismissed. (Toshniwaf Bandiju v. State of Punjab, (1996) 1 PLJR 475).

9. Truth as a defence

In Perspective Publications Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra 1971 Cri LJ 268 Supreme Court held that it may be that truthfulness or factual correctness is a good defence in an action for libel, but in the law of contempt there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which such defence has been recognised.

According to V.M. Kanade vs Madhav Gadkari And Others 1990 CriLJ 190, 1989 MhLJ 1078 truth can be pleaded as a defence only in those cases where the party wants to allege that he has not committed a particular act. For example, if a party is proceeded against on the ground that he has disobeyed an order of the Court, he can plead that he has not disobeyed the order of the Court. In a case where a party is being proceeded against on the ground that he has written an article or published an article, he may plead that he has not written or published the article.

In Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. Rama Krishna Hegde 2000 (10) SCC 331 it was  held that truth can be pleaded as a defence in contempt proceedings.

In Re Arundhati Roy Contempt Petition (Crl.) 10 of  2001 Supreme Court observed,  " Contempt proceedings have been

initiated against the respondent on the basis of the offending and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit making wild allegations against the court and thereby scandalised its authority. There is no point or fact in those proceedings which requires to be defended by pleading the truth.”

By an amendment by Act 6 of 2006, a substitution for section 13 w.e.f. 17-3-2006 was made in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as follows

S 13. Contempt’s not punishable in certain cases-

13. Contempt not punishable in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,—

a) No court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice;

b) The court may permit, in any proceeding for contempt of court, justification by truth as a valid defense if it is satisfied that it is in public interest and the request for invoking the said defense is bona fide.

Thus in Contempt of Court Truth can be raised, if and only if Court is satisfied that truth is said in public interest and the request for invoking the said defense is bona fide. Thus there is no absolute defence of Truth in contempt cases.

10. Other Defences (Section 8)

Section 8 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads-:

S 8. Other defences not affected

Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any other defence which would have been a valid defence in any proceedings for contempt of court has ceased to be available merely by reason of the provisions of this Act.

In Atmaram Kanosir v. L.K.R. Prasad 1990 Cr LJ 169 Supreme Court held that If there is specific time limit in the direction, such noncompliance cannot be regarded as willful or deliberate disregard of such direction.           

In V.M. Kanade v. Madhav Godkari 1990 Cr. LJ 190 Supreme Court held that the power to inflict punishment for contempt of court cannot be invalidated on the ground that law which does not allow plea of truth as a defence is in contravention of Act. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

In High Court v. T.K. Subamma 1990 Cr LJ  1159 Supreme Court held that While Ss. 3 to 7 mentions special acts that are not contempt, s. 8 by implication indicated that the Act is not exhausted as to what is not contempt.

In Pritam Pal v. High Court M.P. AIR 1992 SC 904 Supreme Court held that an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is not an essential ingredient to the offence of contempt of court.  It is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere.

In V.M. Kande v. Madhav Gadkari 1990 CrLJ 190 Supreme Court held that Truth of the allegation when the contemnor says that he can prove, cannot be put up as a defence in charge for contempt of court.

 03. What is not a defence

The following are upheld by Supreme Court as not valid defences.

1. Vinod Mani Diwakar v. Union of India, (1995) 29 ATC 12 (CAT Pat)

Non-compliance of order of Tribunal after filing of SLP amounts to contempt unless order has been stayed.

2. Mantosh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1996) 2 PLR 317

Mere filing of appeal does not automatically operate as stay of order in appeal, and non-compliance of order as such will amount to contempt.  

3. Firm Ganpat Ram Raj Kumar v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285

Transfer of an officer who was posted at relevant time can be no ground to defeat implementation of judgment/order.

4. S.P.Agarwal v. R.R.Upadhya, 1978 Cr. L J 789 (All)

If a counsel advised a litigant not to obey the order of a court of law as such an ill-advice of counsel cannot be a valid defence in contempt proceedings. It is the duty of each and every person who is a party in a proceeding before a court to comply with the order of the court and if he has any grievance against the order he is free to file appeal or to make application before that court for modification or discharge of the same, but unless that order is stayed, varied or modified the party concerned has no justification to flout the order of the court. Obtaining advice from the advocate and not obeying order is no defence.

04. Mens Rea and Contempt

In Emperor v. Debi Prasad Sharma 1942 Oudh WN 6 (I), Court approved of the statement in Tek Chand's Law of Contempt that "motive of the contemnor cannot be considered in determining his guilt". In McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co (1949) 336 US 187 (J), Douglas J. said at p. 191:

"The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant, did the prohibited act. An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently."

In Lal Behari v. State AIR 1953 All 153, it was held by Allahabad High Court that no mens rea is required for an offence of contempt of court; what was meant is that no criminal intention or motive behind the deliberate doing of an act is required. If accidentally a person disobeys an injunction, it can be said that there is no wilful disobedience by him and he cannot be committed for contempt. The expression "wilful disobedience" was explained by Warrington J. in -- 'Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban Council', 1910-2 Ch 190 (H).

In Ram Charan And Ors. vs Debi Dayal Dubey AIR 1955 All 483, 1955 CriLJ 1223, Court held that absence of mens rea does not include ignorance of   law.    He   would   be guilty   of   contempt   even though he did not have an actual intention of disobeying the order or committing contempt of court. 

"It has  been held repeatedly that a person  may be   guilty   of   contempt   even   though there was no intention to commit contempt.    The question in such  cases  is not what was  the  intention  of the offender but what was the effect of the publication";

In Ratan Narain Mulla vs The Chief Secretary, Govt. Of U.P 1975 CriLJ 1283 it was held that  the Contempt of Courts Act requires a 'wilful' disobedience of a decree which contemplates some sort of "mens rea." This is another feature which distinguishes the present case from the cases discussed above. The Government not being a natural person can have no 'mens rea'; only its officers can.

In Abdul Karim v. M. K. Prakash And Ors 1976 AIR 859, 1976 SCR (3) 276 it was held that  even if it could  be urged  that  mens  rea            as  such  is  not  an  indispensable ingredient of  the offense of contempt, the courts are loath to punish  a condemner if the act or omission complained of was not willful.

In S. Abdul Karim v. M.K. Prakash, 1976 CrLJ 641 : 1976 AIR (SC) 859 : 1976 CAR 124 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 102 : 1976 Ker LT 184 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 2170 it was held that  the standard of proof required to establish a charge of ‘criminal contempt’ is the same as in any other criminal proceeding. It is all the more necessary to insist upon strict proof of such charge when the act or omission complained of is committed by the respondent under colour of his office as a judicial officer.

In Ladies Corner, Bangalore vs State Of Karnataka And Anr ILR 1987 KAR 1710, 1987 (1) KarLJ 402 it is observed, “In S. Abdul Karim v. M. K. Prakash, it is held that the standard of proof required to establish a charge of criminal contempt is the same as in any other criminal proceedings. It is further held that it is all the more necessary to insist upon the strict proof of such charge and the act or omission complained of is committed by a person under colour of his office as a judicial officer. This decision followed the decision in Debabrata Bandopadhyay v. State of West Bengal, . It is also held that the mens rea is not as essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court. Similar view is also expressed in R. v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1956) 3 All ER 494.”

In S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay Appeal (crl.)  1491 of 1995  it was held that  merely because an action or defence can be an abuse of process of the court those responsible for its formulation cannot be regarded as committing contempt, but an attempt to deceive the court disguising the nature of a claim is contempt. If the facts leading to a claim or defence are set out, but an inference is drawn thereby stating that the stand of the plaintiff or defendant is one way or the other it will not amount to contempt unless it be that the facts as pleaded themselves are false. Even if it could be urged that mens rea, as such, is not an indispensable ingredient of the offence of contempt, the Courts are loath to punish a contemner, if the actor omission complained of, was not wilful.

In In Re Arundhati Roy Contempt Petition (Crl.) 10 of 2001 it was held that  it is no defence to say that as no actual damage has been done to the judiciary, the proceedings be dropped. The well-known proposition of law is that it punishes the archer as soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target.

In Chotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and Ors.2001 AIR SCW 3208 the intention to commit contempt or mens rea is immaterial in a case of contempt of court. But it may be relevant in the context of the sentence to be imposed.

In Patna High Court held that  the presentation of a distorted official document and thereby obtaining advantage from the Court is a contemptuous act in Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421.

05. Conclusion

There is no absolute defence available to the contemnors in contempt proceedings and whatever available is at the mercy and judgment of the Court. Very often as the Court acts as the prosecutor judge to uphold its own dignity, the ends of justice for which the judiciary eternally stands for gets forgotten. Hence the variation of available defences for classes of people in a hierarchy that is sitting judges, retired judges, those from judicial background etc. on the topmost layer, often gets exonerated if they show reverence to the Court. The most severe punishments as a class are directed towards press, activists, advocates, politicians, executives etc.

In the case of mens rea it can safely be said that the element of mens rea is not applicable in Contempt proceedings, however it may be considered in awarding punishments.

As concluding words, I may quote that the dignity of the judiciary rests ultimately on the actions of the judges themselves, and not on the opinions of its critics, for the time is the greatest critic.